A Voice You Could Call a Voice

Self-immolators sacrifice themselves for an ideal. To what end?

by

Birgitta Gerlach

Season Categories Published
MP807 In Review

Mar 05, 2024


Share on

The Winter of Despair: Jan Palach and the Collapse of the Prague Spring | Kurt Treptow | The Ukrainian Quarterly, 1990

The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath | Kieran Williams | Cambridge University Press, 1997

Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam | ed. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen | Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986


In January 1969, in Prague’s Wenceslas Square, a 20-year old college student named Jan Palach set himself on fire. Today, Palach is immortalized across the city in statues and plaques for his act of political protest, which would inspire Czechoslovakians for decades and eventually helped animate the Velvet Revolution.

In January 2018, minutes after leaving my first orientation for a study abroad program, I stumbled across some of these memorials: two statues and an accompanying poem. I had arrived at Václav Havel Airport the day before, with a massive suitcase and one hefty winter coat. A large group of other American students loitered and talked by the baggage claim. Group by group, we were sent into the city by program employees, who translated our addresses for the taxi drivers. I arrived at my program-rented apartment and met the three other American girls who’d be my roommates. That evening, we went for dinner with the downstairs apartment—also program students. By the next day, after an orientation in a Charles University building—with its view through double-paned windows across the Vltava River—I was socially spent. 

I gratefully moseyed in silence towards the river. Three months in Prague! Foreign city, foreign language, hordes of new, unknown American students to sift through in search of friends … and there they were: two tall metal statues planted by the river, one a smooth, shiny silver, the other a dark, rusted brown. Each had a cubic base, with long, regularly-spaced spikes emerging from the cube’s top face. The silver statue’s sharp, pointy spikes angled away from each other. The rusted brown statue’s dulled spikes rose straight up. Beside them, a poem:

The Funeral of Jan Palach

When I entered the first meditation                              
                                     I escaped the gravity of the object,
I experienced the emptiness                      
                                   And I have been dead a long time.

When I had a voice you could call a voice                                                                 
                       My mother wept to me:
My son, my beloved son                 
                                I never thought this possible,

I’ll follow you on foot.                                              
                          Halfway in mud and slush the microphones picked up.
It was raining on the houses                                                                 
         It was snowing on the police cars.

The astronauts were weeping                
                                 Going neither up nor out.
And my own mother was brave enough she looked                                                   
                                       And it was alright I was dead.
                                                                                                               

This was the first I had ever heard of Jan Palach. The strange, blunt features of the statues against Prague’s gray winter sky intrigued me, as did the poem’s haunting, mournful atmosphere. 

Last month, Aaron Bushnell, a 25-year-old active duty member of the U.S. Air Force, posted on Facebook: “Many of us like to ask ourselves, ‘What would I do if I was alive during slavery? Or the Jim Crow South? Or apartheid? What would I do if my country was committing genocide?’ The answer is, you’re doing it. Right now.” 

Then he lit himself on fire in front of the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C. “I will no longer be complicit in genocide,” he said in a video of the self-immolation. “I’m about to engage in an extreme act of protest, but, compared to what people have been experiencing in Palestine at the hands of their colonizers, it’s not extreme at all. This is what our ruling class has decided will be normal.” 

Hearing about this, I immediately thought of Palach. Would Bushnell’s act prompt wide-scale political action? Would it simmer in the national consciousness only to erupt years later? Or would it disappear, forever a blip in a news cycle? What was it that gave Palach’s specific act such enduring political significance? 

I had investigated this question before, while researching Palach in the fall of 2018, after returning to my usual college life in Washington state. I’d found that most English-language texts addressing him did so only briefly. Yet the process by which a human life can end and take on a political life has been examined, by thinkers across the world. The 20th century Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati, for one, analyzed the “shahids” who he said played a prominent role in the Iranian Revolution—yet his insights have rarely been applied to other political contexts. 

Palach’s immolation came during a period of dashed optimism, after the so-called Prague Spring. It was only the year before that Alexander Dubček, the head of the Czechoslovakian government, pushed for liberalizing reforms that were intended to give socialism a “human face,” a now-famous phrase. While these reforms were popular among everyday Czechoslovakians, the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact feared a threat to communism’s future in Czechoslovakia and beyond. In the evening of August 20th, 1968, Soviet forces invaded and occupied the country to halt the reforms’ implementation.

At first, Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring was met by a rise in Czechoslovakian political activity and protest. Student groups, the working class, and the intelligentsia presented a strong oppositional front, but they either “stopped short of making a real challenge” or grew demoralized by a lack of progress. The Soviets moved to reestablish a sense of normalcy and discourage political protest. “By January, 1969,” wrote the historian Kurt Treptow, “despondency and apathy were becoming widespread.”

It was in response to this growing resignation that on January 16, 1969, Palach walked to Prague’s Wenceslas Square and set himself ablaze. Notably, Palach’s immolation didn’t explicitly protest the invasion itself; it was targeted at the Czechoslovakians—aiming to jolt them out of their political apathy. Three days later he died in the hospital from third-degree burns.


Shariati, an intellectual figurehead in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, examined the shahid: an individual who chooses to sacrifice their life for a larger cause. In purposefully sacrificing themselves for an ideal, the shahid absorbs the cause’s value into themselves. By doing so, in their death, they leave behind the realm of mere personhood and become “thought itself”; the shahid becomes the very ideal they died for. Importantly, the shahid dies for an ideal that is fading away, resurrecting it with their death. The shahid “calls it back again to the scene of the world. By sacrificing his existence, he affirms the [hitherto] vanishing existence of that ideal.” Here lies the shahid’s particular power. The shahid outlives their own death by embodying the ideal whose existence they renewed in the act of dying; the shahid remains present even after death. 

Shariati used the “blood and the message” to describe the respective tasks of the shahid and their survivors. The “blood” refers to the shahid’s death. The “message” refers to the responsibility to spread the shahid’s message, which weighs on the survivors. These survivors, he argued, are obliged to align reality with the principles for which the shahid sacrificed themselves—creating new communities and societies that exemplify those ideals. 


Like Shariati’s shahids, Palach actively chose his death. He also fulfilled the shahid’s essential role of “witness,” in his effort to renew life to the cause of Czechoslovakian autonomy. In his suicide note, Palach wrote, “Because our nations are on the brink of despair, we have decided to express our protest and wake up the people of this land. … Remember August. In international politics a place was made for Czechoslovakia. Let us use it.” (Palach initially claimed to be part of a group whose members all intended to immolate themselves in political protest, hence the use of “we”; it is still unclear if there ever was such a group.) 

In an echo of Shariati’s “blood” and “message” distinction, Palach distinguished his act from the actions he hoped to prompt among the Czechoslovakian people. He describes his task: to die, to jolt the people of Czechoslovakia out of their political apathy by killing himself, and the task of the Czechoslovakians: To spread Palach’s message, and fight for freedom from the Soviets. Palach’s comments on his deathbed highlight this distinction: “My act has achieved its purpose. But it would be better if nobody repeats it. Lives should be used for other purposes.” 

Shariati argued that “if blood does not have a message, it remains mute in history.”  Palach’s suicide inspired a number of immolations by other Czechoslovakians, but none had a comparable impact. In the month after Palach’s death, Jan Zajic, for example, lit himself on fire and also left a suicide note. But this letter “differs significantly from Palach’s,” Treptow wrote. “It does not outline a specific political program … Zajic’s suicide was a protest of despair … rather than an act to achieve a positive political result.” 

Zajic’s suicide left behind no “message” in the sense Shariati describes — and according to Treptow it “aroused little public anxiety.” Palach, in contrast, articulated a specific political message, and thus left behind a specific political duty to be fulfilled. As long as the Czechoslovakians remembered Palach and spread his message, he remained a potent symbol, a rhetorical embodiment of the cause of Czechoslovakian self-determination that could be used to serve that very end. 


The days immediately following Palach’s death saw increased political activity. On January 24th, 1969, a minutes-long national strike paid tribute to Palach, and his funeral the next day was attended by hundreds of thousands of Czechoslovakians. 

Yet these collective actions failed to coalesce into an immediate political force. While Dubček may have supported the sentiments driving Palach’s self-immolation, he was not, Treptow wrote, in a position to make any concrete policy changes. And as Czechoslovakian politicians struggled to find a balance between honoring Palach’s act and discouraging copycats, Czechoslovakians, particularly students, began to feel disconnected from the country’s leadership, identifying them more with the Soviets rather than the Czechoslovakian populace. This allowed the Soviet Union to remove reformist politicians without fearing the public backlash that had been previously anticipated. Dubček’s eventual removal from office marked the definitive end of the Prague Spring and any potential for real reform, sending Czechoslovakia into a period of political despondency. 

Neither anti-communist sentiment and protests nor Palach’s political force, however, ended with Dubček’s removal. Twenty years later, in 1989, the Czechoslovakian communist regime fell. While historians primarily view this collapse in relation to a period of mass protests and strikes in November of that year, its seeds were planted months earlier, in January, with a week of demonstrations commemorating the 20th anniversary of Palach’s death. 

Police beat and arrested the peaceful protestors, foreshadowing dynamics to come. Notably, Václav Havel and 14 others were arrested for laying flowers at the location of Palach’s immolation, cementing Havel’s role as the leader of the anti-Soviet resistance. This week of clashes is now regarded by some to be the real beginning of the revolution that culminated in the overthrow of the communist system. 

The year proceeded with sporadic protests and demonstrations, and on November 17th, a peaceful student march was met first with police and other government forces who violently forced the crowd to disperse, injuring hundreds of protesters in the process. 

The next nine days were marked by mass protests with hundreds of thousands of attendees and strikes of increasing proportions. By the end of these ten days, communist leaders begrudgingly realized the only way to resolve the crisis would be to concede to the opposition’s demands. The Communist Party initially hoped to maintain political relevance by only removing certain politicians without disrupting the underlying order. Ultimately, however, this plan proved fruitless and had to be abandoned. On December 10th, a new government was formed and President Husák resigned, leaving the resistance movement, called the Civic Forum, in control.

A year later, Prague’s Red Army Square was renamed Jan Palach Square. Before thousands of attendees, Havel, who became the last president of the new Czechoslovakia and the first of Czech Republic, recalled the protests of 1989, saying, “I had a feeling then that after 20 years, the great Jan Palach’s ultimate sacrifice was beginning to take on its full meaning … Now I’m certain of it.” ▩


The Arab World’s New, Dubious YouTube Radicals

In the last decade, the revolutionary energy of millions has been extinguished—replaced by a new, pseudo-revolutionary form of political engagement.

by

Fouad Mami

Season Published
MP708

Aug 02, 2023


Share on

E

very August 14th, veterans of the Arab uprisings remember the Raa’ba Al-Adawiya massacre, which took place in a suburb of Cairo in 2013. Raa’ba Square had been a protest zone for more than six weeks, recalling Tahrir Square in January, 2011. In Raa’ba, the supporters of President Mohamed Morsi, most of whom were Muslim Brotherhood members but also other Egyptians hailing mostly from the outskirts of Cairo and impoverished parts of the country, called for restoring “legitimacy.” This meant reversing the coup d’état which the General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led the previous July, with support from mostly well-off Egyptians and liberals. That August 14th, law enforcement under el-Sisi swept in to clear the camps, and in the process killed at least 800 people. 

The unrest had begun in Tunisia, where protests in 2011 felled a dictator, emboldening Egyptians who believed the regime of Hosni Mubarak favored the rich and left the poor behind. These protests fragmented the capitalist class, a minority of whom wanted Mubarak’s son Alaa to inherit his father’s post. Mubarek could not survive the division of the ruling class; he had to leave after 18 days, and a military council assumed control over Egypt. In June 2012, a candidate for the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi, was sworn in as a democratically elected president.

He didn’t last long. Much of the public felt Morsi, committed to the Brotherhood, failed to rule on behalf of all Egyptians. Spurred by the military, a movement called tamared—sedition—insisted on the immediate termination of Morsi’s tenure. Though the tamared movement emerged from a genuinely popular coalition, it was seized on by reactionary forces who wanted to restore the old order. Those reactionary forces invested in el-Sisi, who was Morsi’s defense minister. With the coup, el-Sisi defeated the Brotherhood, and he proceeded to silence members of the anti-Morsi coalition who had made it possible for him to mount his coup in the first place. el-Sisi’s support now comes mostly from the two rich Gulf sheikdoms, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

The Muslim Brotherhood played a confusing role in these processes. It did not support the revolution until it was clear that Mubarek would soon be ousted. And amid much of the turmoil, the Brotherhood remained cautious, lest it anger the military. Yet after the Raa’ba Al-Adawiya massacre, el-Sisi outlawed the Brotherhood, squashing his political rival. In the wake of anonymous attacks on police stations, el-Sisi classified the Brotherhood as a terrorist entity, and effectively froze all its activities, whether political or not. 

Following the coup, el-Sisi put the position of President on hold—an insignificant official, Adli Mansour, was momentarily put as head of state—and a year later el-Sisi won a sham presidential election. The ceremony of his swearing-in took place in the renovated palace of the last and deposed king, before the Free Officers’ revolution of 1952. That ceremony has been el-Sisi’s way of telegraphing a restoration—recalling the restorations of 1848—a desperate attempt to roll back time to the good old days of the monarchy, when commoners did not dare challenge their social betters.


In the last ten years, the revolutionary energy of millions has been extinguished. It has been replaced by a new, pseudo-revolutionary form of political engagement. Every night, potential revolutionaries watch their preferred opposition leader, who happens to be a content creator and a media guru, as he or she scathingly criticizes the regime, points out its many deficient policies, and foretells its imminent collapse. 

Thusly, a vast pool of potential demonstrators has turned into passive viewers of “revolutionary” TV and YouTube channels. A population of active revolutionaries who could alter reality in favor of the revolution has become a set of depressive audiences in virtual space. Their perceived obligation to keep abreast of the scandalous pitfalls of the regime is satisfied by “analysis.” Online activists count millions of views on social media platforms and TV stations. But they are not likely to foster true revolutionary ardor anytime soon. 

Political shows are not a new phenomenon in the Arab world. But with the eruption of the uprisings in 2011, they become more popular, drawing millions of viewers each night. Indeed, calls for demonstrations could not have been possible without internet democratization. And after el-Sisi’s coup, nightly or weekly shows transmitted by Egyptians from their Turkish exile emerged as a vital breath of fresh air. 

Yet to collapse physical space through internet and satellite broadcasting is not a viable long-term political strategy. Given the restrictive conditions established by the coup, politically active populations cannot tolerate indefinitely a political opposition that mobilizes from the safety of exile. Calls for action yielded no action. They resulted instead in inebriated audiences. 

Primetime, breathtaking shows on stations like Mekameleen TV and Elsharq TV expose the poor performance and endemic corruption of el-Sisi’s government. From one’s spot on a cozy sofa, and armed with either a remote control or a Samsung phone, the politically conscious, and what has been left of the democracy militant, thinks he has mastered the world by taking his daily or weekly dose of pseudo-revolutionary content. Passively, that viewer feels empowered, witnessing the exposure of scandal after scandal.

The shows peddle ramblings and ruminations about the el-Sisi regime, mistaking the coverage for the hard stuff that might actually bring it down, and create the conditions for an egalitarian order. With the militant on the sofa, the vomits and excrements become perverse entertainment, without which he or she cannot confront the next day or week. In what used to be the revolutionary camp, one finds audience who have adopted the characteristics of the post-truth world with surprising nonchalance, as they entertain the lie, in the daily or weekly spectacles, that el-Sisi’s fall is imminent.

Consider one show, With Moataz, hosted by the former sports journalist Moataz Matar on the Elsharq TV station. Before Matar’s eviction from his Turkish exile to London in early 2022, the show ran five days a week and almost two hours each night. The show presented as investigative journalism, with leaks and exclusive reporting from “reliable sources inside the regime,” and Matar has become a celebrity all over the Arab world for his fiery introductions, famously always ending with the adage Allah Ghalib: “God is victorious.” 

Besides detailing the dysfunctions of the Egyptian regime, the show trades on the genre of wailing, a weeping style of (mostly) poetry in Muslim Shiite theology that evokes the painful memory of the killing of Prophet Muhammed’s grandson, Hussein. While neither Matar does not literally cry, nor are audiences are not solicited to literally cry, all are nevertheless invited to loath in self-pity. With time, audiences start deriving a pathological satisfaction from their own inertia before the incumbent counterrevolutionary orders. Revolution-as-entertainment places these audiences in the camp of the rightful. But when rightfulness reverses into an identity taken for granted, one loses sight of what it is to constantly see and act on what rightfulness means and demands. Viewers finish the show with loads of pathos, but little ethos or logos. 

The whole oppositional endeavor results in the massive emergence of passive and ahistorical freaks, devoid of substance and vitality. The closing phrase which has secured Matar’s fame, “God is victorious,” is precisely a call for passivity. Since God is all knowledgeable and powerful, the defeatist reasoning goes, why bother putting one’s life on the line by mounting a revolution? 


The content of such TV and YouTube shows is indeed incendiary. On October 3rd, 2022, on the show Officially el-Sisi Offers Egyptians for Sale, Matar claimed that the regime officially acknowledged the existence of a market for collecting body parts, and selling them to rich clients from the Gulf. By founding the biggest center for transplanting body parts in the Middle East, el-Sisi, according to Matar, institutionalized what used to be a black market. 

Similarly, on Oct. 4th, 2022, on a show titled Defecting Intelligence Officer: Uprisings Began My Income Increased and Missions Changed, a defected officer recounted how his superiors in the notorious Algerian secret intelligence charged him with following the hirak activists, famous for the popular uprisings in 2019. The former officer recounted the extra-judicial regulations by which intelligence disappeared activists, such that there existed no chance for loved ones to learn their whereabouts. 

Amid such startling reports, those who were meant to be influenced by that militant substance, and carry out the revolutionary work, instead begin to assume that the fall of such a monstrous el-Sisi’s regime must be a matter of time alone. They start assuming that the military regime is rapidly disintegrating and cannot survive the stream of scandals exposed every night. Everyone fantasizes about the impending fall of the regime, but no one dares to assume the steering wheel of the revolution, since it has been imagined to be already unfolding, miraculously, all by itself.


Over the last ten years, the fiery content meted out each night has enforced the false omnipresent. Even when it is subversive, as political opposition, revolutainment, as I call it, is not only non-revolutionary but dialectically counterrevolutionary

Ask the content creators and “celebrity revolutionaries” of YouTube what it is, exactly, they desire. When squarely pushed for an answer, which of the two choices is the dearest to their hearts? The downfall of el-Sisi’s regime as they profess they want to see—a situation that can only come with the end of their gold-mine businesses in political opposition—or the infinite perpetuation of the current situation? 

Their heart favors the latter option. Celebrity Algerian oppositionists can generate from YouTube something between $1,500 to $2,000 per night. With certain Egyptian oppositionists-entertainers, the sum is easily three or four times that figure. The farcical state of affairs recalls a telling scene in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov. Jesus Christ makes a second coming and freely engages in healing work, whereupon the Grand Inquisitor ushers Jesus into the prison. Jesus meets this fate because his message stands at odds with—and has literally interrupted the mediating and corruptive work of—the church. Likewise, in the event of the fall of the military regime in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, celebrity YouTubers and career oppositionists will become personas non grata; their entertaining content will no longer have an audience because the work needed, that of consciousness-raising, will be over. For career oppositionists, true emancipation of their respected polities spells the gravest disaster.  


YouTuberSubscribersOther remarksLinks to check the evidence
Moataz Matar3.88 m (since 2010)11m on FacebookKnown before in Elsharq TVhttps://www.youtube.com/user/ma7atetmasr/about
Mohammed Naser900 K (since 2018)Known before in Mekameleen TV (1.89 m since 2016)
Abdullah El Sharif4.3 m (since 2008)Sarcasticweekly episodeshttps://www.youtube.com/c/abdullahelshrif/about
Yousef Hussein (known as Joe Show)3.48m (since 2015)Sarcastic weekly episodeshttps://www.youtube.com/c/JoeShowAlaraby/about
Mohamed Larbi Zitout892 k (since 2018)Daily scandals, analysis. https://www.youtube.com/c/MohamedLarbiZitoute/about
Amir Boukgors (known as Amir DZ)1.31 mDaily Scandals https://www.youtube.com/c/AMIRDZBOUKHORS

The present enforcement of the counterrevolution is not, of course, a fault of strategy on the part of the oppositionists and media gurus, or a conspiratorial infiltration that directly sells out to the regime. Rather, oppositional media coverage and exposure of the regime’s many scandals—recently the frantic style has cited the lustful practices of key regime figures—operate in what the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel described as the Law of Necessity. Sure, if the agents of the Egyptian regime put their hands on any of the opposition journalists, they will send those oppositionists behind the sun. But the propulsion of both regime and revolutainment nonetheless lead to the same outcome: Both have succeeded in obliterating the materiality of the revolution—the first, through its iron hand and repressive approach; the latter by marketing the illusion of the revolution’s imminent ignition. 

To test the commensurability of the oppositionist-entertainers’ work with the counterrevolutionary project, recall that, even when living standards have routinely worsened from those under the late President Mubarak’s era, Egyptians have not marched to the streets or descended to squares. Poverty has reached unprecedented levels and Egyptian public debts are ascendant. el-Sisi’s regime might be diplomatically isolated and financially weak, but it is nevertheless vicious in its dealings with ordinary Egyptians. 

Amid the farce of the el-Sisi regime, why no social explosion? Here enters revolutainment, blinding its audiences into the ways history is made. Consider Hegel’s “Knowledge of the Absolute,” through which ordinary people, not intellectuals or vanguard leaders, decide when and where to jumpstart a revolution. According to Hegel, world-shaking events such as uprisings are neither kicked off through a constitutive assembly, nor by mobilization, nor are they repressed through repression. No amount of repression alone can repel people from deciding their fate. Likewise, no amount of top-down mobilization alone is going to convince people to take to the streets. 

Absolute knowledge underlines a people’s collective will—which often remains obscure, for observers and even the people themselves—to jump into history, reverse enslavement, and mount a revolution. It is a collective crossing from a passive threshold of consciousness to an active one, whereupon a historical subject registers his or her permanent movement toward emancipation. Acquiring the certitude of oneself is the understanding that one’s singularity finds its explanation only in the historical motion in which one becomes one with the world, a universal subject, irrespective of geography, language, religion, or culture. Revolution is nothing but the individual’s return to origins, to a desalinated ontological state. When risking their lives in actively anticipating the desalinated world, true revolutionaries cannot help but experience joy. They do not know any of the dejection or fear that fundamentally marks the entertainment-oriented revolutionaries we have been decrying. Revolutainment impairs that necessary threshold of consciousness. It actively impedes that emancipatory return. 

Revolutainment, contrary to revolution, thrives on monetization through YouTube viewers. The animating principle of both opposition and regime is a fetish we have all accorded the name of “money”—or surplus value. Instead of serving humanity’s need for exchange, the cumulative effects of surplus value and debt on a global scale have started assuming a life of their own, independent of humanity’s actual needs. When the alleged revolutionary camp and the counterrevolutionary party both fetishize money, independently of the means of accumulating that surplus value, one must then be deranged to expect their basic interests to diverge. 

Through their pseudo-thinking, proponents of revolutainment dupe their audiences into thinking that the problem with lies with el-Sisi, his mismanagement, or military background. The real enemy cannot be el-Sisi, the military, or the remnants of the Mubarak regime. The real enemy is not even the capitalists, with their repressive or regressive outlooks, religious or otherwise. The real enemy is money. Until a new moneyless order emerges through workers’ strikes and major organizing, money will keep the world, not just Egypt or the Arab World, estranged from true emancipation. With everyone accessing basic necessities according to their needs, not according to their hours at work, the realm of quantity will be abolished and that of quality will emerge. This is not a futile objective. There are solid historical antecedents, such as the Paris Commune in 1871, Barcelona in 1836-37, and northeastern Syria from 2012-2018.

Forces of revolutainment never broach, let alone engage with, this radical understanding of how the counterrevolution must unfold. The images of piles of dead bodies bulldozered like city rabbles in Ra’baa are available on YouTube, still haunting collective memories. Can we think of double murder, one by soldiers shooting physical bullets, bulldozers turning those bodies into minced meat, the other allegorical as pretentious media renders these sacrifices against tyranny into naught? ▩


Nie Wieder

Haunted by WWII, Germany is famously reluctant to wield military power. War in Ukraine—and an ascendant Green Party—have ushered in a new era.

Battle

by

Julius Koch

Season Published
MP503

Mar 15, 2022


Share on

In early February, German newspapers described Olaf Scholz’s performance at a joint press conference with Joe Biden as strange and bewildering. It was the German chancellor’s first visit to the U.S. since taking office last fall. The glaring agenda item was Vladimir Putin’s belligerent decision to amass Russian troops along Ukraine’s borders.

In question was Germany’s reliability to its western partners. The heads of state emphasized the depth of friendship and mutual trust between their two nations, but journalists’ questions immediately exposed a palpable disconnect regarding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The construction of the natural gas tube running beneath the icy waters of the Baltic Sea was officially completed in December. It stood to benefit Germany, which it would supply with natural gas, and Russia through the corresponding cash flow. Threatening to suspend the project, some thought, could deter Putin’s aggression.

President Biden sought unity on the matter, promising that the project would be shut down if Russia invaded Ukraine. But Scholz, with his characteristically sheepish expression, was deliberately vague, refusing to even refer to the pipeline by name.

Just a few weeks later, Germany underwent one of its most significant foreign policy reversals of the post-war era. Prompted by Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine, Germany took actions that just a few weeks prior would have been totally unthinkable. It suspended the opening of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, directly sent weapons to Ukraine, allocated an additional $113 billion to its military, and made a constitutional commitment—to the NATO target of devoting two percent of GDP to military spending—which it had long avoided. It also began individually approving requests by other countries holding German weapons to send them Ukraine’s way, a significant shift, given how many arms on the continent are at least partially German-made. Scholz’s stirring speech announcing the new course of action in the Bundestag was met with a medley of applause, jeers, and gasps.

The new measures represent a striking departure from the studious pacifism that has characterized German foreign policy since World War II. While the shift was clearly catalyzed by Putin’s attacks on Ukraine, it also reflects the vision of an ascendant Green Party leadership, which, in what some describe as a “post-pacifist” break from recent tradition, has pushed Germany to take a more confrontational approach in world affairs.


This story begins where it must. The nationalist movements that sprung up in Europe during the 19th century found their most virulent manifestations in German fascism in the 1930s. With the coming and passing of the ensuing nightmare, the period after 1945 brought about a stark shift in the way Germans viewed themselves and their country. As the flagrant moral adversary of World War II, Germans took on a collective sense of shame, beginning a long process of reckoning and confrontation with the horror of their crimes. Still, geopolitical forces threatening to pull Germany right back into international conflict were already at work.

As suspicions between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. grew, Germany became the ultimate proxy, as it was literally split into two opposing and autonomous halves in 1949. The first post-war West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer found himself conducting a delicate balancing act—seeking political influence among western powers to assist the development of the fledgling state, without permanently alienating East Germany. Overzealous alignment with the U.S. risked jeopardizing any chance of German reunification.

In the post-war years, Germany strove to operate strictly multilaterally. While this may suggest a relinquishing of autonomous decision making, the fact that the country was initially occupied by outside powers meant that joining multilateral organizations actually increased its participatory say in the international domain. Other Western European countries, meanwhile, had an interest in harnessing West Germany’s production capacity against the potential threat of a Soviet invasion. Economic and political integration with Germany could also prevent the country from starting another war.

The European Steel and Coal Community was established in 1951 in an effort to prevent future conflict on the continent. A prototype for the European Union, it facilitated the exchange of key strategic resources among former enemies, like France and Germany. Militarily, similar efforts were underway, and West Germany was admitted into NATO in 1955. The Soviets followed suit, integrating their satellite state of East Germany into the defense-oriented Warsaw Pact and the economically oriented Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Thus commenced a German tradition that has persisted ever since: an insistence on multilateral action abroad.


The Cold War had begun, and German social movements, like many around the world, sought revolution, or at least the abandonment of chauvinistic values understood to have animated the world wars. As the movements dissipated, the Green Party, founded in 1980, provided a conduit through which to channel their lingering momentum. The Greens swept an unconventional cohort into the parliament. With their long hair, beards, and knitted sweaters, they cut amusing figures among the prim suits of the German Bundestag.

Environmentalism, pacifism, social justice, and anti-nuclear technology were the Green Party’s main principles. The faction was ideologically divided into fundamentalists (known as “fundis”) and realists (known as “realos”). The fundis counted radical ecologists among their ranks, and generally regarded the Greens as a protest party, rather than a governing one. The realos, meanwhile, sought to actively govern and participate in policy discussions, and were prepared to compromise on the party’s more radical positions if necessary. By the end of the ‘80s, many of the fundis had exited the party. The Greens were on a moderating trajectory, seeking, despite their internal tensions, to govern Germany as part of a federal coalition.

Shortly after the party’s founding, Europe was rocked by massive protests against the U.S. deployment of ballistic Pershing missiles in European NATO territories. The well-known German author and Nobel laureate Heinrich Böll, as well as former Chancellor Willy Brandt, conferred a particular gravitas upon an anti-arms movement already fueled by immense popular support. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament organized many of the protests, and the episode reflected Germany’s pacifistic tendencies throughout the Cold War.

It was a Green Party figure who would be tasked with resolving some of Germany’s biggest foreign policy dilemmas. Joschka Fischer did not begin as a typical politician. At the twilight of his teenage years, he joined the 1968 student movement, and in the coming years was swept up by increasingly radical social currents. As a militant leftist he joined the so-called Putzgruppe, a name derived from a German acronym for “Proletarian Union for Terror and Destruction.” Fischer led street brawls, and a camera captured him clubbing a police officer (the record would plague him later in his career). In the ‘70s, a string of violent episodes involving the “Rote Armee Fraktion” or RAF, a radical left-wing terrorist organization that kidnapped and murdered politicians and business executives, led Fischer to discard his belief in violence as an instrument for creating political change.

After a stint in the German parliament, and later at the state level as minister for the environment in Hesse, Fischer had become one of the Green Party’s most outspoken realos. When the Social Democrats, in a now reunified Germany, formed a governing coalition with the Greens in 1998, the former’s leader, Gerhard Schröder, tapped Fischer to be his foreign minister. Fischer would soon face a dramatic dilemma that set his party’s deepest convictions against the fear of being complicit in another genocide on the continent.

The eruption of war in Kosovo led to a resurgence of ethnic tension and violence that had, sadly, become common after the breakup of Yugoslavia. The latest conflict pitted Kosovo Albanians, the demographic majority of the population of Kosovo, against the Serb forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Observers and participants feared another genocide, with reason. Only a few years prior, the Balkans had witnessed the Srebrenica massacre, an episode of abject violence in 1995, during the Bosnian war, in which more than 8,000 male Bosniak Muslims were gunned down by Bosnian Serb troops loyal to the Serb Secessionist Republic. The event distressed Fischer specifically and the Greens more generally, prompting a reevaluation of the unconditional pacifism that had been a key tenet of the party.

As foreign minister, Fischer saw it as his mission to ensure that fascism, war, and genocide were permanently rid from Europe. Despite the absence of a U.N. mandate, Germany decided to join the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo. Fischer was convinced, along with his political partner Chancellor Schröder, that foreign engagement was the only way to prevent the sorts of atrocities of which Germany had itself been so recently guilty.

The intervention caused a major stir in Germany. At a party convention debating the decision, someone slung a paint bomb that perforated Fischer’s ear drum. Protestors outside depicted him with a Hitler mustache. Still covered in red paint, Fischer defiantly proceeded to give his planned address. Famously, he justified the Kosovo intervention with the motto, “nie wieder Auschwitz,” literally translating to “never again Auschwitz.” It was a significant moment for Germany. The crisis in Kosovo became the setting for the first deployment of German troops since World War II.

Still, Fischer was no warmonger, and despite the pressure of allies, he upheld Germany’s pacifistic impulses when the stakes were high. At the Munich Security Conference in 2003, he challenged the U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s claims, which would later be debunked, about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. He convinced Schröder not to join the war in Iraq. Fischer remained one of the mission’s loudest critics, and the German position caused friction in its relationship with the U.S.

Germany later joined the conflict in Afghanistan, which became the country’s second post-war military engagement following the NATO intervention in Kosovo. German troops, however, were stationed in the stable and peaceful north, and away from the combat-heavy south. Annoyed allies continuously exerted pressure on Germany to play a larger role in the south, but it never relented. In many ways, the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan solidified German skepticism about armed intervention abroad.


The recently departed Chancellor Angela Merkel dominated the last 16 years of German politics, and foreign policy during her tenure reflected a pragmatic instinct for the middle way. Merkel, or “Mutti,” as Germans facetiously called her (an old-fashioned, endearing version of “Mom”) forged a trusting relationship with her people. For many Germans, she blended an essential competence with intelligence—evidenced by a background in quantum chemistry—and humility—evidenced by myriad social media posts showing her doing her own grocery shopping.

If Merkel’s leadership had a coherent foreign policy, it was defined by German business interests. In the notoriously export-heavy country, trade relationships loom large. Seeking amicable relations wherever possible, Merkel received frequent criticism for her clear hesitance to speak out against the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Chinese Communist Party. (Her implicit strategy—the idea that economic integration would inevitably lead to liberalizing reforms in China—has not paid off.)

The German military, meanwhile, has been sparsely funded since World War II. NATO membership guaranteed that the U.S., with its military might, could be relied upon if Germany’s security was ever seriously threatened, or if a situation abroad ever called for an intervention. Thus, Germany could rest easy gutting its armed forces and invest the savings elsewhere. Former President Trump frequently admonished Germany along these lines, indignant about its refusal to adhere to NATO military spending targets. Still, when his presidency strained U.S. relations with customary European allies, Merkel became vocal about producing an autonomous European foreign policy, echoing French President Emmanuel Macron, who has called for the establishment of a European army.

Germany has no term limits, and many analysts believed Merkel would have been re-elected had she decided to run. But she left office on her own volition. After a four-term stint in office, in which she led Germany—and to an extent, Europe—through its debt calamity, a refugee crisis, Brexit, and the outbreak of the pandemic, it was time to prepare for a future without “Mutti” at the wheel.


Climate change has become perhaps the most salient political issue in Germany, and there is a relatively broad popular consensus about the urgency of abating emissions; the Greens’ election chances looked promising as a result. Foreign policy, by contrast, is not a particularly important topic in German politics, and the recent election cycle was no exception. The final debate among the candidates for the Chancellery didn’t feature a single question on the matter.

The Greens’ campaign was spearheaded by a double-pronged leadership of Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock, and the latter became the Green Party’s first ever candidate for the chancellery. With five months to go until election day, they’d displaced Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats from the top spot in the polls.

The Greens ultimately received just 14.8 percent of votes cast. It was a disappointing showing, sufficient for the party to enter negotiations and form a coalition government with the center-left Social Democrats and the libertarian Free Democrats, but well shy of the majority required to control the chancellery itself. Baerbock conceded that she had made mistakes in the race. Accusations of an inflated resume, and somewhat-overblown allegations of plagiarism, undermined her credibility. Still, she secured her second-most favored position: foreign minister.


The coalition government echoed that of Schröder: a Social Democrat chancellor with a Green foreign minister. Baerbock had long been calling for a new German strategy amid tensions abroad. “In the long run,” she once said, “eloquent silence is no kind of diplomacy, even if in the last few years it has been seen as such by some.” The statement was a thinly-veiled critique of Merkel—and a pitch for an assertive, post-pacifist approach. In harmony with that vision, Green politicians openly criticized the Nord Stream project, and called for a more confrontational engagement with the Chinese and Russian governments, given their authoritarian tendencies. Baerbock, with astute foresight, argued that the gas pipeline was being used by Putin to gain leverage over the West by making it dependent on Russia, and as a means of further isolating Ukraine, which would no longer feature as an important player in the transfer of natural gas from east to west.

While the Greens were looking to shut Nord Stream down, the Social Democrats defended the pipeline vehemently. Scholz’s party regarded Russia with ambivalence, its muddled position embodied in the public eye by the activities of its former chancellor. Since losing to Merkel, Schröder, has served in various capacities in Russian oil and gas firms like Gazprom and TNK-BP. He’s also become an infamous Putin apologist, having cultivated a longstanding friendship with the Russian president.

Baerbock now led the foreign ministry, but the implications of this were unclear. A German foreign minister is subordinate to the Chancellor, as the Merkel era clearly demonstrated. And Scholz signaled that he was looking to stick to the Merkel playbook of avoiding direct confrontation wherever possible. As Russia built up its military presence along Ukrainian borders, and allied pressure to respond grew, Scholz remained deeply suspicious of measures that might heighten tensions further.

When Habeck, the Green co-leader and economic minister, proposed the deployment of weapons to Ukraine last year, he was reportedly lambasted. German reliance on Russian energy undermined its leverage, especially considering its limited energy options amid its efforts to mitigate carbon emissions. As a sign of the Greens’ long-term ideological influence, and of Germany’s differences with nuclear-loving France, nuclear energy is off the table in Germany. It prepares to shut down its final three plants this year. Besides energy concerns, many Germans have an appreciation of Russian heritage and culture, with a corresponding willingness to hear out its political arguments and positions.

Then Putin’s invasion of Ukraine began. As, over just a few days, countries around the world rushed to indirectly support Ukraine’s defense through sanctions, goods, and arms, in Germany, behind-the-scenes policy discussions produced a domino effect. Permitting allies to send German weapons to Ukraine prompted the question of why Germany wouldn’t just directly send arms itself. Announcements of a newly bolstered military budget quickly followed, and Germany consented to blocking Russian banks from the SWIFT payment transferring network. Observers framed Scholz’s announcements as a “historic u-turn” in German policy—but Baerbock had his back. “When our peaceful order is being attacked,” she said, “we need to face up to this new reality.”

Still, a cultural attachment to pacifism runs deep among the German population, including—and in some ways, especially—among the Greens, a party founded on nonviolence. In conversations in the days following Scholz’s announced measures, fellow students and older Germans expressed apprehension about the country’s militaristic posture. As menacing ecological and geopolitical forces brew, Germany continues strive for a delicate balance, guarding against the impulses that shaped its own dark history, while ensuring it isn’t complicit in the murderous campaigns of strongmen abroad. ▩


Trump, You Can’t Just Say That About Someone!

by

Max Ogryzko

Season Categories Published
MP00 Life

Jul 14, 2017


Share on

In the beginning of the semester, when I was still getting acquainted to the election and its candidates, when I still considered Donald Trump to be a novelty rather than a menace, I was bored and found a YouTube clip titled something like, “Best Trump Moments of his Campaign!” It was around 20 minutes in length, and I ended up watching the whole thing – not because I was actually that bored, but because I was entertained. I thought it was hilarious, and started laughing out loud at several points. Afterwards, however, I was a little taken aback. The things Trump said were at the very least controversial, and for the most part blatantly offensive. Not only that, but he said these things at rallies, debates, talk shows – spaces where humor, or laughter even, is not typically present. So why was I laughing? The things that he said were so ridiculous, so out of character for these events, that my response was laughter rather than outrage. It was funny.

According to Joshua Gunn in his essay titled On Speech and Public Release, this makes perfect sense. Gunn uses the example of the deli scene from the movie When Harry Met Sally to show that a breach in what he calls the “public/private distinction” can be funny. Sally screams orgasmically, an obviously private expression, but does it in a public New York deli. Gunn describes this as a type of “threshold crossing.” Once the threshold is crossed, the response of the audience, in this case, is laughter.

Gunn also remarks that currently our understanding of the public/private distinction seems to be “rapidly transforming and continually under assault”; that it “is ceaselessly asserted anew at and in different locations and context.” Based on Gunn’s ideas, it seems that Donald Trump has made its newest location the election of the President of the United States. However, this isn’t actually new. Presidential candidate Howard Dean broke the public/private threshold in his infamous “I Have a Scream Speech” in 2004. The difference here is that Dean’s career immediately ended due to him crossing this threshold, whereas Trump is currently the President of the United States. So why is this the case?

Stand up comedy is a medium in which Gunn’s public/private threshold is crossed quite frequently. Typically a person standing on a stage with a microphone will speak in a professional manner. Maybe they are a professor or a visiting lecturer, a politician or the principal of your high school, but in any case, they will most likely not get up on stage and talk about a sexual encounter with four other participants, as Amy Schumer does in the “Just for Laughs” festival in Montreal, or how their friend tried to race the police while highly intoxicated, as Dave Chappelle does in his comedy show “Killing Them Softly.”

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJ3dk6KAvQM

This specific area of public/private crossing doesn’t just allow some flexibility in the rhetoric and speech topics of the comedian, but if done correctly can allow for extremely racist or sexist language to not only be accepted, but be egged on and met with laughter. Immediately after entering the stage at his “Live at Beacon Theater” show, Louis CK tells the audience to turn off their cell phones, not to take pictures, and also “No Jews… Jews aren’t allowed. If you’re Jewish, this is a good time to go. If you see someone kinda Jew-y lookin’, tell an usher and they will [escort them out].” Comedian Dave Chappelle, remarking on R. Kelly’s alleged urolagnia, says “you guys are confusing the issue. While you guys are busy worrying about whether R. Kelly even peed on this girl or not, you’re not asking yourself the real question, that America needs to decide once and for all, and that question is: how old is 15 really?” These comments, in context, were of course met with rapturous laughter from their respective audiences.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iod2tfiL_ZM

In the first Republican Presidential primary debate, when asked to explain himself for calling women fat pigs, dogs, and slobs, Donald Trump retorts, “only Rosie O’Donnell.” The insult is welcomed with laughs and applause from the audience that attended the debate, a response that eerily resembles that of an audience at a comedy club. Even the host of the debate, Megyn Kelly, cannot help but hold back a smile. Similarly, in the second Presidential debate, after Hillary Clinton remarked that “it’s just awfully good that someone with the temperament of Donald Trump is not in charge of the law in our country,” Trump immediately responded, “because you’d be in jail,” a comment that received a similar reaction from an audience that had pledged to stay silent. Even Bill Burr, a professional stand up comedian, has said in his podcast that Trump has “great one liners” and that he is “hilarious – he kills.”

Donald Trump has said many controversial and highly offensive things while running for the highest office in the United States, and yet has gotten relatively little flak for them. This is certainly partly due to the fact that many of his constituents agree with his rhetoric and values. However, another reason may be that his rhetoric is so unpolitically correct, so ineloquent, and so absolutely ridiculous in nature, that he crosses the public/private threshold that Gunn describes in a way that allows many of his voters to brush off his comments just as they would if a comedian in a comedy club had said them; that rhetorically, Donald Trump presents himself not as a politician, but more as a stand up comedian.

In response to being asked about Rosie O’Donnell making fun of him on “Late Night with David Letterman,” Trump says, “I’ve known Rosie for a long time, you know – I’ve always felt that she’s a degenerate…” A comment to which Letterman laughs and then replies “Wait a minute. You can’t say that. You can’t just say she’s a degenerate.”

Yes he can.